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Abstract
Conflicts of interest are a very widespread ethical problem which, precisely for that
reason, deserves special attention, both from a legal viewpoint and from the point of view of
ethics applied to organizations and professions. In this paper we use the conceptual
framework of agency theory to explain what constitutes a conflict of interest. This enables us
to identify what causes conflicts of interest and analyze the ethical criteria to be applied to
them and the solutions commonly proposed. Because our processing of information, our
judgments and our decision making are subject to significant unconscious and unintended
biases, the emphasis in this paper is on the conditions that an agent’s decision must satisfy in
a conflict of interest situation in order to be ethically correct.
Keywords: Agency theory, Agent, Conflict of interest, Corruption, Ethics of professions,
Principal. 
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Introduction1
In recent years, conflicts of interest have started to attract much more attention from
society, above all in response to various recent scandals. Examples of such conflicts are easy
to find:
•  A doctor advises her patient to undergo certain tests or treatments in the doctor’s
own clinic or one in which she has a financial interest or that belongs to a
relative.
•  A doctor recommends medicines manufactured by pharmaceutical companies
that pay for her holidays, trips or medical equipment.
•  A doctor advises a patient to take part in a research project, related to the
patient’s illness, for which the doctor will receive some kind of remuneration.
•  A public official sits on a disciplinary committee that has to judge the behavior
of a professional ally (or enemy).
• An academic evaluates articles submitted to scientific journals by professional
allies (or enemies).
•A   consultant recommends that the content and scope of her brief be broadened,
with the result that she earns more.
• An employee advises against introducing new technologies for which she lacks
the necessary training.
•A   manager receives from her employer stock options whose value may be
influenced by her professional conduct.
•A   financial analyst issues undeservedly favorable valuations of a company’s
shares because the organization she works for is involved in selling those shares,
or because her remuneration is linked to the performance of the investment
banking department that is managing the sale.
1 This study is part of a research project on corruption and business ethics. I would like to thank the José y Ana
Royo Foundation for financial assistance. And I thank Prof. Domènec Melé for his comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.•  A financial analyst gives a buy recommendation on securities that are part of her
own portfolio or that of a relative.
•  A bank helps to promote an offering of shares by a company of doubtful
solvency because the share issue will enable the bank to reduce its credit risk in
the company.
•  A judge must decide a case that affects a company belonging to her brother.
•  An employee of an auditing firm issues favorable assessments of a company’s
accounts that may help to ensure that the employee continues to receive work
from the company or that the auditing firm wins contracts to provide other
services to the company.
•  A politician or public official advocates the hiring of a party colleague.
•  A former minister is hired by a company that operates in an industry for which
the former minister was responsible while in government.
•  A politician or public official must decide the award of a contract for which one
of the bidders is a relative.
•  A lawyer represents two of the accused in the same criminal trial.
Conflicts of interest arise in many of the decisions that professionals, managers and
employees, as well as public and private companies and organizations, have to make in the
course of their normal activities. Note that not all of the situations listed above are necessarily
immoral; but they all can lead to immoral action, and so are examples of conflicts of interest.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss possible solutions to the problem of conflicts
of interest, especially from the point of view of business ethics. First, we review the concept
of conflict of interest and its moral evaluation. Then, we look at the principal legal, ethical
and practical solutions that have been advocated, ending with the conclusions.
Conflicts of interest
In a broad sense, almost all human decisions involving other people give rise to
conflicts of interest: for example, an employee’s interest in increasing her earnings conflicts
with her employer’s interest in reducing the company’s wage bill; and a doctor’s interest in
reducing her workload conflicts with her patient’s interest in receiving better medical
attention. But this concept is too broad and unworkable; conflict of that kind is inevitable,
and all we can do is rely on the institutions and incentives that coordinate the interests of the
two parties, and ultimately on the morality of their behavior2.
Strictly speaking, a conflict of interest arises in any situation in which an interest
interferes, or has the potential to interfere, with a person, organization or institution’s ability
to act in accordance with the interest of another party, assuming that the person, organization
or institution has a (legal, conventional or fiduciary) obligation to do so.
2
2 Cfr. Carson (1994), Moore (2001). This definition contains the following elements3:
•  A person, organization or institution (company, public service, government,
NGO, etc.), which from now on we shall call the “agent”4,
•  that has a legal, contractual, conventional, professional or fiduciary (and
therefore ethical)5 obligation or duty, or that holds a position of trust6,
•  to act, as agent or trustee, in accordance with the interests of another party, which
we shall call the “principal”7,
•  which may be another person, organization or institution8.
•  The agent has another interest, which she wishes to satisfy (or frustrate),
•  which may be a personal (financial or non-financial) interest of the agent herself,
•  or of another person or institution (relative, friend, religious or ethnic
community, company, NGO, union, political party, etc.),
•  toward which the agent has a contractual, conventional, professional or fiduciary
duty9,
•  and that other interest is wholly or partly incompatible (or is believed by
the agent to be incompatible) with the interest of the principal10,
•  so that it prevents or obstructs, or has the potential (or is thought to have the
potential) to prevent or obstruct, the performance of the agent’s duty toward
the principal.
This definition may seem too broad because it would include conflicts arising as a
result of having more than one principal (for example, a lawyer who represents two clients on
opposite sides of a legal dispute) and “role conflicts” (for example, when a doctor who is also
a researcher advises a patient to take part in a research program in which the doctor is
3
3 The definition adopted here is based on Boatright (2000); see also Boatright (1992), Carson (1994), Davis
(1982, 1993), Luebke (1987), and Margolis (1979). 
4 Agency theory is an appropriate framework for explaining conflicts of interest. Cfr. Boatright (1999). 
5 The ethical duty, although different in nature, coincides with the legal, contractual, professional, etc. duty;
ethics is the moral dimension of that duty or obligation. 
6 Also, in an organization with explicit or implicit rules regarding the conduct expected of its members that
prohibit the pursuit of unjust personal benefit. Cfr. MacCoun (2003). 
7 The principal need not be the customer. In an audit, for example, the agent will be the company, or rather the
company’s top management, while the principal may be the shareholders, outside investors (including
potential investors), the tax authorities, society in general, other auditors, etc. – in other words, those whose
interests the auditors serve. 
8 If a self-employed professional hires her son as secretary, this does not constitute a conflict of interest, as she
has no obligation to consider any other interest when hiring than her own. There would, however, be a
conflict of interest if the professional belonged to a partnership or firm, because in that case she would have
to take her partners’ interests into account. 
9 It is precisely that obligation or duty –associated with a public or private office, the exercise of a profession,
or paid employment– that distinguishes a conflict of interest in the strict sense. Cfr. Bayles (1983). 
10 This is what differentiates a conflict of interest from cognitive conflict, in which both parties have an interest
in resolving a problem that affects both.involved and for which she is paid)11. However, given that our purpose is to discuss the legal
and ethical solutions to these types of problems, it seems best to keep the definition broad.
For the same reason, we include both “potential” conflict and de facto conflict, which
could be described as “abuse of office or position”12, and even the “apparent” conflict that
arises when the agent thinks that there is a conflict, even if such conflict does not and cannot
exist.
According to agency theory, a conflict of interest arises when three conditions
are met13:
1) Divergence of pay-out: the interest of the principal is diffuse and low value,
while the interest of the agent is concentrated and high value.
2) High information and monitoring costs for the principal.
3) High entry barriers, preventing competition among rival agents.
Moral evaluation of conflict of interest
Attitudes toward conflicts of interest tend to vary considerably. It is often argued that
because this is such a widespread and, in a sense, unavoidable problem, there is no point in
worrying about its ethical dimension, particularly if it is believed that the professionals
involved are the ones best equipped to deal with it. However, this tends to be a relativist
attitude that is frequently refuted by the facts.
With respect to the moral evaluation of conflicts of interest, there is a general
consensus that14:
• It is ethically wrong to act against the interests of the principal in a de facto
conflict of interest. Doing so causes injustice because the agent has a moral
obligation to act in accordance with the interest of the principal15.
• It is wrong to obtain an “undue” benefit, whether financial or of any other kind,
through the exercise of a profession, duty or office – although what constitutes
an “undue” benefit can only be established on a case-by-case basis. For example,
a public official has a right to her salary, but not to additional income for actions
resulting from a conflict of interest. Also, if an auditing firm delivers misleading
reports that cast its client in a favorable light in order to retain that client’s
business, any benefit thus obtained (retaining the client) will be improper. In
both cases, the benefit is improper because it is the result of the agent’s putting
her own interest before that of the principal, which is the interest that should
rightly prevail.
4
11 Cfr. Stark (2003). 
12 Cfr. OECD (2003), no. 13. On the distinction between “risk” and “harm” in conflicts of interest, see
McMunigal (1998). 
13 Cfr. Issacharoff (2003). 
14 Carson (1994) offers a detailed discussion of some of these points. 
15 Obviously, we are assuming that the interests of the principal are legitimate. • The agent has an obligation to provide restitution and make good any harm
caused.
• Unavoidable and systematic conflicts of interest are still conflicts of interest and
must be treated as such. The fact that the agent is not to blame for finding herself
in a conflict of interest situation does not mean that the situation has no moral
consequences.
• Finding oneself in a conflict of interest situation is not in itself immoral if the
agent has acted in good faith.
• It is ethically wrong to put oneself in a situation in which a conflict of interest is
liable to arise, unless there are sufficiently important reasons for doing so. This
rule applies even if the agent intends to resolve the conflict fairly and honestly –
because it is wrong to put oneself at risk of acting immorally without sufficient
justification.
• In a potential conflict of interest situation, there is therefore a scale of ethical
evaluations, depending on the likelihood that the agent will act immorally, the
agent’s share of responsibility for finding herself in that situation, the scale of
the harm that may be done, and the importance of the personal interest that
conflicts with the interest of the principal.
• The agent must not only avoid any actual conflict of interest, but also the
appearance of a conflict, unless there is sufficient reason, because integrity in a
person’s work or profession is a good that must be protected – although it is not
an absolute good and therefore depends on circumstances or, as some authors
contend, allows exceptions16. The agent also has a duty to preserve society’s trust
and respect for her company, office or profession.
• It is immoral to put pressure on a person to accept a conflict of interest because it
is unjust to induce a person to do something wrong, or put her at risk of doing
something wrong.
•A   conflict of interest may cause harm to third parties and, therefore, be an
injustice toward them. For example, if a doctor advises a patient to undergo
treatment in a clinic in which the doctor has a financial interest, she may be
engaging in unfair competition toward other clinics that offer the same treatment,
perhaps on better terms for the patient.
• An agent involved in a conflict of interest must assume her responsibility for
managing her own private interests in relation to her office, profession or job.
She may not shift this responsibility onto the rules that govern the activities of
the company, organization, market or profession: there is always an element
of personal responsibility.
•O r ganizations and institutions involved in conflicts of interest must also assume
their responsibility to identify and resolve such situations.
5
16 Cfr. Carney (1998).The problem of conflict of interest is closely related to the problem of corruption17.
Corruption can be defined as “a behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public
role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status
gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”18.
Based on that definition, corruption is clearly a type of deliberate or accepted conflict of
interest in which the interest of the agent is illegitimate19.
Some recent work in experimental psychology may help us to understand the
breadth and depth of the moral problem involved in conflicts of interest that are merely
potential20. As a rule, we tend to assume that competent, independent, well trained and
prudent professionals will be capable of making the right decision, even in conflict of interest
situations, and therefore that the real problem is how to prevent conscious and voluntary
decisions to allow one’s own interests (or those of third parties) to prevail over the legitimate
interests of the principal21 – usually by counterbalancing the incentives to act wrongly, as we
assume that the agents are rational and make their decisions by comparing the costs and
benefits of the various alternatives.
Beyond that problem, however, there are clear, unconscious and unintended biases
in the way agents gather, process and analyze information and reach decisions that make it
particularly difficult for them to remain objective in these cases, because the biases are
particularly difficult to avoid. It has been found that22,
• The agents tend to see themselves as competent, moral individuals who deserve
recognition.
• They see themselves as being more honest, trustworthy, just and objective than
others.
• Unconsciously, they shut out any information that could undermine the image
they have of themselves – and they are unaware of doing so.
• Also unconsciously, they are influenced by the roles they assume, so that their
preference for a particular outcome ratifies their sense of justice in the way they
interpret situations.
6
17 Cfr. Argandoña (2000). 
18 Cfr. Nye (1967), 61. The definition given should also include private offices or positions; cfr. Argandoña
(2003). 
19 Corruption is always de facto: the mere possibility or temptation of corruption does not constitute a moral
wrong, although the principle that nobody should expose herself to the risk of corruption without sufficient
reason remains valid. 
20 Among recent studies on conflicts of interest that take account of these contributions from psychology are
Cain et al. (2003), Chugh et al. (2003), MacCoun (2003), and Moore et al. (2002). 
21 With respect to conflicts of interest among auditors, this thesis is shared by, for example, Antle (1984) and
Simunic (1984). It also seems to be the attitude of doctors; cfr. Moore (2001). 
22 For the references to support the arguments that follow, see Chugh et al. (2003) and MacCoun (2003). Moore
et al. (2002) develop these arguments for the specific case of conflicts of interest involving auditors. Some of
their conclusions are particularly interesting: a) the auditor tends to slant her judgment in favor of her client,
whoever the client may be; b) not only the auditor’s report appears to be biased, but also her private
judgment; c) the greater the financial interest involved and the closer the personal relationship between the
auditor and the client, the stronger the bias; d) even relatively moderate incentives are sufficient to bias
judgment; e) the thing that creates the strongest bias is the sense of responsibility toward the firm being
audited; and f) the likelihood and strength of bias tend to be underestimated, even when incentives are
established for the auditor to be impartial. Nelson (2003) reports empirical evidence on auditors’ biases. • Often, their notion of justice is biased in their own favor. For example, in
experiments in which two opposed parties’ concept of fairness is questioned,
both tend to consider precisely what favors them personally, even if
disproportionately, to be the most fair.
• The agents are selective when it comes to assessing evidence; they are more
likely to accept evidence that supports their desired conclusion, and tend to value
it uncritically. If evidence contradicts their desired conclusion, they tend to
ignore it or examine it much more critically.
• When they know that they are going to be judged by their decisions, they tend
to try to adapt their behavior to what they think the audience expects or wants
from them.
• The agents tend to attribute to others the biases that they refuse to see in
themselves; for example, a researcher will tend to question the motives and
integrity of another researcher who reaches conclusions that differ from her own.
Generally speaking, the agents tend to give far more importance to other
people’s predispositions and circumstances than to their own.
For all these reasons, agents, groups and organizations believe that they are capable
of identifying and resisting the temptations arising from their own interests (or from their
wish to promote the interests of others), when the evidence indicates that those capabilities
are limited and tend to be unconsciously biased.
The solutions
A great variety of solutions has been offered to deal with the problems created by
conflicts of interest. Whatever measures are taken will be have to be chosen in light of the
specific situation at hand and the circumstances.
Some solutions are intended to prevent conflicts of interest before they arise. These
include the recusal of the person who has to make the decision, or the divestiture by the agent
of her private interests. Others (not necessarily alternative but complementary to the
preventive measures) are aimed at resolving conflicts after they have arisen. One example is
disclosure23.
Issacharoff (2003) distinguishes between “substantive regulation” of conflicts of
interest, aimed at achieving particular outcomes, and “procedural regulation”, which focuses
on the procedure to be followed in order to prevent conflict or facilitate conflict resolution.
Substantive regulations are easy to formulate (it can be done without having to go
into the details of the relation that is to be prohibited), and convenient for the person in power
or lawmaker who proposes them. And it is assumed that the threat of punishment will
discourage the prohibited behavior. Yet they tend to be ineffective because they cannot take
into account the variety of possible relations between the agent and the principal.
Consequently, they are quite likely to discourage legitimate behaviors, or to prove incapable
of preventing undesirable behaviors. Also, the agents may internalize the punishments,
7
23 The distinction is taken from Carney (1998). Cfr. also McMunigal (1998). in which case the punishments will become part of the agents’ analysis of the costs and
benefits of acceding to a conflict of interest. Moreover, substantive regulations create ex ante
uncertainty; are difficult to apply ex post (depending on the characteristics of the judicial or
administrative system that must enforce them); may magnify the effects of a conflict of
interest (by making it more important to avoid the punishment than to act in accordance with
the interests of the principal), etc.24
For all these reasons, we may prefer process solutions, of which there are many
different kinds: for example, creating an ethics committee in the organization (auditing firm,
consultancy, law firm, hospital, etc.), whose job is to see to it that conflicts of interest do not
arise and that, if they do, they are dealt with appropriately by removing the decision from the
area in which the person subject to the conflict works. Or erecting “Chinese walls” between
the different departments of a financial institution (or other type of professional organization)
to control information flows between them. Or making it illegal for auditing firms to offer
other services (business consulting, tax consulting, etc.) to clients for whom they act as
auditors, etc.
In what follows we shall discuss some of the main solutions that have been proposed
for the problem of conflicts of interest.
Recusal of the person who must make the decision
As was mentioned earlier, recusal is a measure aimed at preventing conflict before it
arises. It consists of transferring the decision from the professional, official, executive or
employee who is in danger of being compromised in the conflict of interest, to another
person. For example, if a company’s personnel manager has to decide whether or not the
company should hire her husband; or if a professor has to grade her own son’s exam; or if
a civil servant or government official must decide whether or not to award a contract to a
company owned by a relative25.
Recusal may be effective in conflicts that arise from outside the agent’s profession
or office (external or private conflicts), provided such conflicts are not too common and
provided the recusal can be done without causing major difficulties. But it will not be feasible
in many internal or professional conflicts26, where the problem is rooted in the professional
relationship with the principal.
Divestiture of private interests 
Divestiture is another measure aimed at conflict prevention. It consists of placing an
obligation upon the agent to dispose of any private interests, either at the time of taking up
her post, office or profession, or whenever the conflict of interest appears. For example, a
central bank executive or finance ministry official may be obliged to dispose of any shares
she owns in the financial institutions with which she will be dealing in her new position, or
to leave the boards of directors of the companies of which she was a shareholder. Or the
8
24 Cfr. Issacharoff (2003). 
25 Often, in this type of situation, it is best not to disclose the conflict of interest, as it may prompt the person
appointed to make the decision to try to ingratiate herself with the agent involved in the conflict of interest,
thus creating the very problem that the measure is intended to avoid.
26 The contrast between external or private conflicts and internal or professional conflicts is taken from
Stark (2003). company’s purchasing director may be required to dispose of any shares she holds in
companies that she will be dealing with as suppliers in her new job27.
This type of measure can be particularly onerous for the agent, as it involves
accepting a financial loss, or abandoning a business activity to which she may have to return
(when she leaves her post or office, for example).
Disclosure of private interests
Conflicts of interest arise in situations of asymmetric information. The purpose of
disclosure is precisely to correct such asymmetry by ensuring that the principal is informed
about the nature and extent of the conflict of interest. Disclosure is probably the most
common solution to the kinds of problems we are talking about here – and often it will also
be a moral duty, insofar as concealing a conflict of interest is a way of misleading or
deceiving the principal, and may cause harm to third parties. Disclosure may take various
(non-mutually exclusive) forms. For instance:
•  Disclosure of private interests that may conflict with the agent’s professional,
contractual or legal duty. For instance, a senior governmental, legislative,
judicial or regulatory official may be required, on taking possession of her office,
to submit a report detailing any personal and family interests (business interests,
share ownership, etc.) that may interfere with the independence and honesty of
her decisions in the future. In some countries a record of these private interests is
kept in a register that is open to the public or only to certain monitoring bodies,
and subject to periodic review or update28.
•  Disclosure of conflicts of interest to the agent’s superior or to a monitoring body
as soon as they arise. For example, a public official or a manager may be
required to declare the existence of a conflict of interest if she has to decide
about the award of a contract when one of the bidders is a company in which she
has a personal financial interest or which is owned by a close relative.
Following this initial disclosure of private interests, various solutions may be
adopted, such as the recusal of the agent from the decision that gives rise to the conflict,
disclosure to the principal of the existence of a conflict of interest so that the principal may
decide for herself whether or not the agent should recuse herself from the decision, etc.
•  Disclosure of conflicts of interest to the principal. For example, a doctor may be
required to explain to the patient whom she invites to join a group taking part in
a research project that she receives a payment for each new patient that joins the
group. It is assumed that the agent will inform the principal truthfully, clearly,
and in detail about the conflict of interest, and that this will enable the principal
9
27 Numerous variations on this type of measure are possible. For example, the agent may be required to sell the
shares immediately, or communicate her interest to an independent body, which will decide whether or not
they must be disposed of. Or ownership of the shares may be transferred to a “blind trust”, managed by
another person, without the involvement or knowledge of the agent. Or the agent may be allowed to retain
her private interest, but subject to monitoring by a supervisory body. On these kinds of solutions, cfr. Carney
(1998). 
28 This register may raise problems of invasion of the agent’s privacy, and may discourage potential candidates
for public office. Carney (1998) offers some useful recommendations on declarations of conflicts of interest.to make an informed and voluntary decision, either to withdraw from the mutual
relationship or to take other protective measures29.
•  The logical counterpart of the disclosure of conflicts of interest by the agent is
informed and voluntary consent by the principal. However, there are some
situations in which, if there is a conflict of interest, the principal cannot give her
consent (non-consentable conflict)30.
•  If the conflict of interest situation is self-evident, disclosure may not be
necessary. Nonetheless, even in such cases it is an advisable precaution31.
Disclosure of private interests has unquestionable advantages:
•  It saves the agent the disadvantages of having to renounce making a decision that
is hers by office or professional qualifications, or having to renounce legitimate
private interests.
•  It simplifies the job of the person in power or regulator, who is released from the
obligation to monitor any conflicts of interest that may arise, the responsibility
falling instead on the agent.
•  It helps the agent to appreciate the risk she runs and make it compatible with her
interests.
•  It improves the efficiency of social and market mechanisms by at least partly
resolving the problem of asymmetric information.
•  It is particularly useful in some professions – legal practice, for example32.
But it also has certain drawbacks33:
•  It does not eliminate the problem, it merely makes it known. Ultimately, there is
nothing that can save the principal having to assess the moral quality of the agent
in the particular case at hand.
10
29 Morin et al. (2002) point out how unlikely it is that a process of this kind will lead to free and “informed
consent” by the patient. Ueltzen and Dean (2001) detail the conditions that a disclosure of this kind must
meet in the case of an auditor. 
30 Cfr. Moore (1997), on conflicts of interest among lawyers in the United States.  
31 It is sometimes suggested that conflicts of interest should not be disclosed because the advantages, even if
there is a conflict of interest, are greater than the disadvantages – for example, because a patient’s
participation in an experiment will have important benefits for medical science. Or because the conflict of
interests is considered unavoidable – for example, if a doctor has invented a new prosthesis, only she can
place it. Nevertheless, it appears to me that, in these cases, the agent still has a duty to inform the principal,
so that the principal can make an informed and voluntary decision, after weighing the consequences for
herself and for society. Cfr. Moore (2001). 
32 MacCoun (2003) gives some reasons for this conclusion. A lawyer acts always in defense of a partial interest:
nobody is going to imagine that a lawyer is an impartial seeker after truth. In a court case, both parties will
have proper legal representation. There are standards of clear evidence, and an impartial judge who decides
in light of the cases put forward. And the opposing parties’ positions probably map the limits of the truth.
However, these conditions obviously do not apply in other professions.
33 For a detailed analysis of some of these arguments, see Cain et al. (2003) and the bibliography given there.  •  The principal will still have the problem of adapting her judgment to any
information that is disclosed. For example, if a financial expert advises the
principal to buy shares in a particular company and reveals that she herself owns
shares in that same company, in what way and to what extent is the advice likely
to be distorted as a result of the conflict of interest? How can the distortion be
corrected? In other words, although disclosure removes or mitigates one of the
causes of conflicts of interest –the high information costs– it cannot resolve
another – the high monitoring costs.
•  “Anchor effects” occur: the starting point influences the entire process, even if it
is known to be irrelevant or biased. If the expert starts by recommending the
shares of a particular company, that recommendation will condition all
subsequent judgments, as experiments have shown. The principal will find it
difficult to “forget” the information she has been given, even though she knows
it to be biased, or even false. Information that is repeated earns greater
confidence on the part of the principal. And information received earlier tends to
acquire a higher truth status than information received later, even if it is known
to be false.
•  The principal tends to overestimate the role of the agent’s predispositions and
underestimate the circumstances of the advice, including the fact that there is a
conflict of interest.
•  For all these reasons, the principal is unlikely to be able to fully discount the bias
caused by the conflict of interest, even if it is honestly, completely and clearly
disclosed.
•  The disclosure will also influence the agent. On the one hand, it may make her
more honest, because she knows that the principal will be more alert to possible
biases.
• But it may also have the opposite effect, whether through strategic exaggeration
(increasing the bias, so that it is not neutralized by any correction the principal
may make); or through “moral license” (the agent considers that having
disclosed her interest, she has already fulfilled her obligation toward the
principal and from now on can safely ignore the principal’s interest)34; or
because the fact of being obliged to disclose the conflict induces the agent to do
so partially or incompletely.
•  There is no guarantee that the disclosure will leave the principal any better
placed to give her free and informed consent. For instance, if a doctor advises a
patient to have treatment at a clinic in which the doctor has a financial interest
and declares that interest, the patient still will not know whether the treatment is
necessary, or whether the clinic that the doctor has recommended is suitable or
not. And obtaining that extra information (for example, by seeking a second
opinion) may be very expensive.
•  Disclosure may weaken the principal’s confidence in the agent, owing to the
conflict of interest; but it may also strengthen it if the disclosure is interpreted as
11
34 Cain et al. (2003) points out that, according to empirical studies, the agent’s bias is accentuated when the
conflict of interest is disclosed. proof of the agent’s honesty. This may induce the principal to commit more
serious errors of judgment35.
•  If the disclosure of a conflict of interest is not reiterated at regular intervals, it
may cease to have any effect on the principal’s attitude.
•  There are some conflicts of interest that cannot be resolved or mitigated by
disclosure. For example, even if a researcher reveals that she has a financial
interest in obtaining particular results from her work, we cannot be sure whether
that interest has influenced her results (except by conducting an in-depth analysis
of her work).
•  In any case, if disclosure of a conflict of interest is not made out of moral
conviction, there will have to be some incentive for the agent to effectively
comply with the disclosure requirement, either in the form of a legal obligation
(with the corresponding penalty in the event of non-compliance), or an
obligation to pay compensation for harm caused (if no disclosure was made, or if
the information disclosed was false or incomplete), or the threat of loss of
reputation, etc.
Opening the field to competition
If one of the root causes of conflicts of interest is the fact that there are barriers that
prevent agents from competing with one another, then one way to prevent, or at least
mitigate, such conflicts will be to open the field to competition.
In some cases, a market solution may be possible, provided that there is sufficient
competition and the (financial, reputation, etc.) costs of conflicts of interest to the agent are
recognized36. For example, banks have privileged information about the customers to whom
they make loans, and they could use this information to their own benefit and against the
interests of other customers. A bank could, for example, underwrite the flotation of shares by
a company that owes the bank money, and advise its customers to buy those shares, with the
aim of reducing the volume of the company’s debt held by the bank and so reduce the risk it
has in that company. Of course, in a competitive market, investors would be aware of this
possible conflict of interest and would demand a risk premium for buying the shares, which
would effectively reduce the shares’ selling price. Conscious of this, and driven by
competition, banks would have an interest in signaling to the market that they are willing not
to be swayed by this conflict of interest, possibly by forming an underwriting syndicate with
other respected banks37.
The market solution may be the most desirable, but it will only work if certain
conditions are met, such as there being sufficient information about the nature of the conflict of
interest, transparency about prevailing market conditions, and a sufficient level of competition
(in terms of number of competitors, lack of differentiation of the product or service, etc.). In
many cases, however, these conditions are not met. Therefore, opening the field to competition
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35 This will depend on factors such as the intensity of the conflict, the suspicions of the principal, the nature of
the disclosure of conflict (whether it is generic or specific, whether it is made by the agent or by a third
party), etc. 
36 Cfr. Boatright (2000).
37 There is evidence that this practice reduces the risk of conflict of interest and thus also the premium
demanded by investors. Cfr. Narayanan et al. (2001). may also be a conscious and ethical decision by the agent, who avoids any conflict of interest
by offering the principal various alternative solutions. For example, if a client asks a tax
consultant for advice on how to invest, the consultant may suggest various alternatives,
including those in which she has a personal or family interest, which she will disclose.
Often, competition is complementary to other measures, such as disclosure of
conflicts of interest, which helps to offset information asymmetries and so makes competition
more effective38.
Structural changes
Another set of measures prevents conflicts of interest or mitigates their effects by
changing the structure and organization of the institutions in which such conflicts are liable to
arise. These measures are aimed at correcting the information asymmetry mentioned earlier,
or reducing the expected benefit of satisfying the agent’s personal interest (by imposing fines,
loss of reputation, etc.).
In financial institutions39, for example, measures have been taken to organize
different functions in separate legal entities, or at least in divisions with different
geographical locations, different management and different compensation systems (“Chinese
walls”); limits on analysts’ pay (so that it is not directly linked to individual deals, or directly
or indirectly influenced by the investment bank’s trading performance); rules prohibiting
analysts from reporting directly to the investment banking arm; restrictions on analysts’
private portfolios, etc.
Similar structural changes aimed at preventing conflicts of interest can also be made
in organizations other than financial institutions. For example, rules that prohibit auditing
firms from performing other services (such as business consultancy, for example). Or
restrictions on the business activities that people holding particular public posts are permitted
to engage in after leaving public office – on account of the insider information they have had
access to or the influence they have acquired over government or regulatory activities40.
Other measures
Professions, companies and organizations that are particularly prone to conflicts of
interest must have rules designed specifically to identify conflicts and the risks they entail, so
that they may be avoided or, if necessary, resolved in the best manner possible. These rules
may be imposed by law, by regulations drawn up by an official regulator, or by individual
industry, market or company codes of conduct, etc. They will include prohibitions41; internal
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38 In fact, disclosure of conflicts of interest without competition is ineffective; for example, if a town has only
one clinical laboratory, in which all the local doctors have an interest. However, competition can also create
incentives for conflicts of interest; for example, when the consequent fall in an auditing firm’s profits
encourages it to branch out into other lines of business that come into conflict with its work as an auditor.
39 On the structural changes proposed in financial institutions, cfr. Boatright (2000) and Forum Group (2003). 
40 The restrictions have to do with the period of employment search and acceptance, private sector activities in
areas related to the person’s previous activity, relations with the public officials or politicians who take her
place in her previous job, etc. Cfr. Carney (1998).
41 For example, rule 1.7(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association
establishes: “A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited
by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests...”
(quoted in Moore (2001), p. 9, note 41; see also Moore (1997), p. 548, note 45).and external accountability mechanisms; management policies and systems, processes and
practices designed to ensure that the interested parties accept their responsibility to comply
with the letter and the spirit of the rules; auditing systems (both internal and external) to
detect possible non-compliance; penalties; measures to protect disclosure and declaration of
information by agents affected by conflicts of interest; guides and tools for communicating
and publicizing the rules, and training in applying them, etc.42
Ethical attitudes toward conflicts of interest
The solutions described in the preceding sections are, at least partly, rules provided
by the legislator, the regulator or society to prevent conflicts of interest or mitigate their
harmful effects. But if the agent wishes to act in accordance with ethical criteria, she will
have to go further than that.
The first thing a person who is at risk of finding herself in a conflict of interest must
do is take the matter seriously, as situations of this kind have important ethical implications,
are quite common, and have non-trivial consequences for the person concerned, the
organization or profession in which she works, and society as a whole. As has already been
said, the agent must not knowingly put herself in a conflict of interest situation, unless she
has sufficient reason to do so. And if she finds herself in such a situation, she must do her
best to get out of it, if she can (for example, by renouncing her personal interest, or by
handing the decision over to someone else). In any case, she must follow the rules laid down
by the relevant law, regulations or code of conduct for conflicts of interest. But she must not
confine herself to complying with these rules if they do not adequately resolve the problem
at hand.
If the agent finds herself in a conflict of interest that she cannot avoid, she must
follow the rules of prudential decision making. First, she must find out exactly what the
situation is, in relation to whom the conflict of interest43 has arisen, what kind of conflict it is,
what her legal, fiduciary or professional obligations toward the principal are, and the relative
importance of the conflicting interests. When studying the various alternatives, she must
consider how each affects her duty of justice toward the principal and any third parties
affected, and thus also the consequences of the action for herself, the people she works with,
the principal, her client (if client and principal are not the same person), and third parties
(including professional colleagues), without overlooking the risk of collaborating with the
misconduct of others (by instruction, induction, advice, consent, instigation, participation or
concealment).
Given the unconscious and unintended biases mentioned earlier, it is advisable to
seek counsel from a person who has the necessary expertise and maturity of judgment (and
accept and follow it if it seems correct); to analyze one’s own and other people’s experiences
in similar situations (recalling what happened in the past is part of the prudential decision
making process); and to exercise one’s skill in finding solutions other than the one that seems
most desirable at first sight (by considering the exact opposite strategy, playing devil’s
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42 Including regular reminders of the rules on conflicts of interest; information to new recruits to the
organization or profession, as well as to third parties; repertoires of practical cases and best practices;
information, help and counseling mechanisms, etc. Cfr. OECD (2003).
43 Bearing in mind that it may affect several parties. For example, a lawyer representing the interests of a
company will also have interests with respect to the company’s owners, managers and other stakeholders.
She will also have interests with respect to former clients who may be affected by the case.advocate, presenting the arguments to an audience that thinks differently from oneself,
developing the arguments from the principal’s point of view…)44. 
The agent must also be familiar with the criteria for an ethically correct decision: she
must understand what obligations flow from her relation with the principal and the different
ways in which she can commit an injustice. In these matters, a mere cost-benefit analysis is
not a good way of finding a solution, as it usually does not take into account the most
important effect that the immoral act will have on the agent herself and her moral learning –
and also on third parties. And lastly, she will have to assume her own responsibility and
follow her conscience45. And if she has made a mistake, she will have to be willing to ask for
forgiveness (and learn from the mistake) and make good any harm that has been caused. In a
word, it is a matter of acting as a competent and honest professional, manager, employee or
public official.
In the case of companies, organizations, partnerships, etc., there is an institutional
responsibility to be assumed in relation to conflicts of interest, by trying to prevent them as
far as possible and seeing to it that they are resolved fairly, always in accordance with the law
and ethics. Organizations must put in place the necessary rules (codes of conduct, for
example), institutions (hotlines, ethics committees, compliance officers, internal and external
auditors), and training procedures to instruct their members in the legal, professional and
ethical criteria applicable to conflicts of interest (courses, public analysis and discussion of
practical cases, etc.).
Conclusions
Conflicts of interest are a very widespread ethical problem which, precisely for that
reason, deserves special attention, both from a legal viewpoint and from the point of view of
ethics applied to organizations and professions. In this paper we have explained what
constitutes a conflict of interest, using the conceptual framework of agency theory. This has
enabled us to identify what causes conflicts of interest, namely the divergence of the financial
pay-out for the agent and the principal, the high information and monitoring costs, and the
existence of entry barriers that limit competition between agents.
In view of all the above, we have analyzed the ethical criteria and the solutions
commonly put forward for resolving conflict of interest situations. Because the way agents
process information, judge and decide is subject to significant, unconscious and unintended
biases, we have placed the emphasis on the conditions that an agent’s decision in a conflict of
interest situation must meet in order to be ethically correct.
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44 This is the advice offered by Cain et al. (2003), p. 22 and MacCoun (2003), p. 14, precisely after explaining
the biases mentioned above. 
45 The decision will have to take into account any collateral measures that may be required – for instance, to
protect a client’s confidential information in an investment bank or an auditing or law firm.Bibliography
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